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The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the discussion on the positive and negative aspects of food 
information requirements, especially in the light of the acceptance of a new food information regulation (EU) 
1169/2011. The methods which are used are legal and literature studies, case studies as well as the provision of 
supplementary data on the effects of food information requirements on consumer choices, costs and benefits. 
The field of food information is complex, since it includes legal, socio-psychological as well as economic 
aspects. The paper describes the major recent changes in food information law and the barriers to 
competitiveness of the European food industry as a consequence of connected problems and pitfalls. It 
suggests technical and legal solutions for improvement. The paper especially focuses on the major barriers to 
innovation: the competition on the package of legal and commercial information, the labelling of novel 
foodstuffs, (i.e., nanotechnology and gmo), and the authorisation of health claims. It advices to overhaul food 
information law: to integrate, simplify and to improve its logic.  
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1  Introduction, problem and goal 
Uncertainty about and complexity of the content and structure of the required information 
to be provided on the food package is a major cause for transaction and investment costs to 
food businesses and public authorities. The regulatory burdens include among others the 
efforts which are made to bring innovative foods to the market (i.e., foods with superior 
technical, nutritional or remedial properties). From a public welfare perspective, incremental 
costs have to be weighted against the perceived extra benefits that users of foodstuffs 
experience of improved transparency and safety of foodstuffs. Scientifically, the provision of 
adequate food information requires interdependently regulatory, economic as well as 
consumer research. This makes the food information field of research complex. Moreover, 
the available  knowledge of the relations between legal (systematic), economic (cost-benefit) 
and socio-psychological (consumers’ perception) parameters which affect adequate 
provision of food information is scattered. An integrated approach is necessary to improve 
the understanding of the multiple effects of food information and facilitate the provision of 
effective policy options to change the European regulatory framework. 
The goal of this paper is to assess the problems and pitfalls of food information in an 
integrated way, especially in the light of the new food information regulation (EU) 
1169/2011. The paper will in § 2 review the novelties in the legal requirements of the 
regulation, as well as address major barriers to innovation in existing food information rules 
and regulations. Question marks to the appropriateness of the newly designed rules (their 
completeness, effectiveness and logic) will be placed. In § 3 the lack of appropriateness will 
be substantiated by means of data and cases including legal, economic and social origins and 





2 Food information: changes, policies and pitfalls 
In this paragraph we will review some of the major recent changes1 to and backgrounds of 
the pre-packed food information system that has been institutionalised on behalf of final 
consumers (including mass caterers). Food information covers all information which is made 
available by means of a label, accompanying material, or any other carrier including modern 
technology (social network media for instance), as well as verbal communication2. The scope 
of food information law has broadened in course of time, especially with the adoption of the 
food information regulation (EU) 1169/2011 in November 2011 (abbreviated as ‘FIR’). In 
Williamson’s classification of social analysis this affects primarily level 2, the institutional 
level (Williamson, 2000). However, European food information is embedded in the European 
tradition and culture. Examples are the labelling and legal requirements of gmo, as well as 
the absolute ban of the use of hormones in the production of beef. Compared to the US, our 
system of requirements to labelling is different on a multitude of aspects. Ultimately, the 
system of food information will affect the way contracts are concluded upon (the ‘play of the 
game’ in Williamson’s words), as consumer’s attitudes influence labelling behaviour and are 
affected by it, and the optimisation of resource allocation on a firm and consumer level. 
Major changes which have been brought about, and which bring the business arena into a 
state of flux, are addressed. 
The FIR repeals or amends several of the more than 100 existing directives and regulations 
that concern food information provision3. In first instance the impression may be that a 
substantial amount of changes and additions have been made. It should be reminded 
however, that the same or similar rules have re-appeared in the FIR at a different place or 
only in a slightly modified form. The general prohibition to mislead is included in the FIR 
again (Article 7 of the FIR; Article 2 of the present food labelling directive 2000/13/EC, 
abbreviated as ‘FLD’), but actually is virtually superfluous, since such a prohibition already 
follows from the General Food Law (GFL; (EC) 178/2002). Article 14 (3) GFL specifies that 
food can be unsafe (and thus may not be put on the market) depending on the information 
that is provided. While some food information provisions are not necessary, other are not 
clear or their effectiveness can be doubted. Many have been transposed literally from the 
present FLD.4  For instance, derogations from the obligation to reveal the quantity of an 
ingredient (Article 22 FIR/7 FLD) if this ingredient is included in the name of a foodstuff or is 
emphasized on the form of a picture, which is included in Article 6 of the FLD, is now to be 
found in Annex VIII of the FIR.  
2.1 Water 
In the FLD, (added) water to a maximum of 5% is exempted from being included as an 
ingredient in the list of ingredients (Article 6 (4) FLD). This exemption ‘does not apply’ 
anymore to meat, meat preparations, unprocessed fishery products and unprocessed bivalve 
molluscs (Annex VII – Indication and Designation of Ingredients, Part A, point 1). ‘Does not 
apply’ should, just like in the FLD, be interpreted that the amount of water has not to be 
                                                 
1  As for now the FLD is still mandatory, or actually the inclusion of labelling requirements in national law of the Member 
States on the basis of Directive 2000/13/EC. 
2  For instance cry-outs on a market or an oral presentation of the food on the plate by the restaurant holder. 
3  The Food Labelling Directive 2000/13/EC (abbreviated as FLD) is repealed, as well as among other 90/496/EC (Nutrition 
labelling). Some other are amended.  
4  ‘Additives’ for instance which are used as processing aids and do not have a function in the final product, are not 
considered to be additives (implicating that they do not have to be specified in the ingredient list with their category 
name and/or e-number).  This is a lack of logic since an ‘additive’ which is not an additive is not an additive at all. 
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considered as an ingredient at all. It is strange that this exemption is included in Part A as its 
heading is “Specific provisions concerning the indication of ingredients by descending order of 
weight”, which only refers to the order of indicating ingredients, not whether ingredients 
should be indicated or not.  
2.2 Nano 
The application in food ingredients of engineered nanotechnology will in future have to be 
indicated in the ingredient list of foodstuffs. The concept is disputed because it is almost 
impossible to find a suitable delimitation since “as used today, the term nanotechnology 
usually refers to a broad collection of mostly disconnected fields”.5 It is not simply the nano-
size that is important, but also the novel properties of engineered substances. Taniguchi 
(1974) has early introduced the concept of nanotechnology, and explicitly referred to size as 
a decisive criteria, but since then its scope has altered (Whatmore, 1999). 
Substances/devices for which the size is critical to performance or behaviour (technical 
novelty criteria) is of importance, but also whether the phenomena which are brought about 
enable new applications (the ‘commercial novelty’ criteria). Applications of nanotechnology 
have enormous potential in the food and packaging industry, but are not without danger. 
The development of novel nano-applications makes it therefore necessary to regulate these 
in the legal framework (Chowdry, 2010; Mehta, 2004). Political barriers to adjust the novel 
foods rlegislation have led the idea to adjust the FIR and oblige food business processors to 
indicate engineered nanotechnology with the word ‘nano’ between brackets after each 
ingredient that is ‘engineered’ on a nano-scale. Surprisingly the package itself, which is 
potentially a major source of ‘nano-hazard’ (intelligent packages including nano-materials, 
etc.), has not been taken into consideration. In this context it should be noted that ‘pre-
packed food’ is defined as consisting of a food and its package (Article 2 (2) – e FIR). 
2.3 Allergens 
Not only have allergens to be included in the list of ingredients, they also in future will have 
to be highlighted in it (with bold or italic letter for instance; Article 21 (1) b of the FIR). 
Allergens will have to be printed, just like all ingredients, with a font size of at least 1.2 mm6. 
New also is the requirement that mass caterers are obliged to provide information on the 
presence of allergenic substances in offered food, even if this food is not pre-packed 
anymore (Article 44 (1) FIR). Member States may decide how this information will be 
provided (Article 44 (2) FIR). The Codex 25%-rule with respect to composite ingredients is 
not at all applicable to European allergen information (see: Kjelkevik et al., 1997).   
2.4 Country-of-origin (or provenance) 
Up until now, the country-of-origin had to be indicated if absence of such information would 
mislead the consumer “to a material degree” (Article 3 (8) of the FLD). Apart from the fact 
that an improvement has been made in skipping the quoted words in the FIR (see Article 26 
(2) –a), the scope of country-of-origin-labelling (cool) has broadened considerably. Cool is  
upon till now mandatory in the case the labelling of beef. This requirement is directly related 
to the BSE-crisis (see in this respect Regulation (EC) 1760/2000). In future, certain kind of 
                                                 
5  Further background information is available for instance via the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology: 
http://www.crnano.org/whatis.htm. 
6  The font size has been heavily disputed. Ultimately a minimal font size of 1.2 mm has been accepted, although 
exceptions (for instance depending on the available package surface) remain. In any case, allergens have to bear a font 
size of 1.2 mm. 
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meat have been added to this requirement– listed in Annex XI of the FIR – the application of 
which depends on the adoption of implementing acts by the Commission (swine, sheep, 
goat, poultry under CN Code Nr. 2010). Depending on these implementing acts, the scope 
could further be broadened to include other kind of meat, but also milk, unprocessed foods, 
single ingredient products, or ingredients representing more than 50% of a foodstuff. The 
requirements contribute considerably to the regulatory burdens of especially SMEs. 
2.5 Nutrition declaration 
Last to be mentioned here, but not the only major change and certainly not the least, is the 
nutrition declaration that will be mandatory for almost all foodstuffs (but some exceptions 
remain – like alcoholic beverages with an alcohol percentage > 1.2% vol.), where at present 
only in case of a nutrition claim such information has to be provided. In many cases nutrition 
declaration is already carried out on a voluntary basis. The nutrition declaration 
encompasses the energy value of a foodstuff plus its content of certain nutrients: fat, 
saturates, carbohydrate, sugars, protein and salt (exceptions are applicable, depending on 
the type of foodstuff and space on the package package). These may be supplemented with 
an indication of mono-unsaturates, poly-unsaturates, polyols, starch, fibre and an indication 
of vitamins or minerals (Annex XIII of the FIR, Part A). Fibre has moved from obligatory in the 
FLD to voluntary information in the FIR. Trans-fats have no explicit place in the nutrition 
labelling yet, pending further research and supplementary rules from the Commission.  
Long transition periods up to five years have been granted because the redesign of package 
information will require investments, especially for those companies that do not have any 
experience with a nutrition declaration. Disputed has been, and still is, the way of presenting 
the information. In some countries, like England and Germany, traffic light symbols are used 
to designate the intake as compared to the daily advisable portion. It still is allowed to do so, 
but it is not regarded as an alternative for labelling in tabular form per 100 g/ml of a 
foodstuff7.    
2.6 Omissions: claims and gmo 
Not only changes have been made in the present system of obligatory food information 
requirements, also omissions and missed chances should be mentioned: the revision of the 
labelling of gmo and of health claims.  
If authorised, health claims are in many cases combined with obligatory nutrition 
information that substantiates this claim. Specific labelling requirements with respect to 
gmo are included in the gmo regulation package, of which for foodstuffs Regulation (EC) 
1829/2003 is the most important, in combination with the general requirement that no gmo 
should intentionally be released to the environment without previous risk assessment 
(Directive (EC) 2001/18).  
 
With reference to the mentioned problems and omissions, we will further address the 
following hypotheses with respect to key deficiencies and omissions of present information 
regulation. 
Hypothesis 1: Information requirements on food ingredients lack logic and contribute to 
transaction costs of food business operators as well as of consumers. 
Hypothesis 2: Present food information requirements with respect to gmo are contra-
productive and impede on the innovation capabilities of food business operators 
                                                 
7  This tabular form may be omitted depending on the size of the package. 
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Hypothesis 3: Present food information requirements with respect to health claims are 
contra-productive and impede on innovation capabilities of food business operators.    
 
3 Disputed food information 
This section provides examples of disputed regulation within the context of the formulated 
hypotheses. We will particularly focus on the effects of information on consumer choices, as 
well as on the economic consequences. Prohibitions and/or obligations to give information 
on a label aims to protect the consumer from digesting foods that are unsafe. The consumer 
comes first, the rights of industry are second in line, as is expressed vividly in Article 37 of 
the FIR: “voluntary information shall not be displayed to the detriment of the space available 
for mandatory food information”. So consumer and business interests may conflict.  
An abundant amount of studies have focused on the propensity to invest in novel 
technologies, consumer’s behaviour with respect to their acceptance, and the connected 
role of the regulatory authorities in the institutional framework. Resource allocation (i.e., 
maximisation of welfare) via food businesses is initiated by human (consumer, managerial) 
behaviour, that itself can be explained from calculative propensities on the one side (like 
controllability, attitude) as well as by ‘subjective norms’ (Ajzen, 1991). Subjective norms are 
in turn legitimized in the social environment, which comprises ‘culture’ as a key determinant 
(compare: Hofstede et al., 2010). Culture (the level of embeddedness in Williamson’s 
framework; Williamson, 2000) is a major determinant for the institutional level, that hosts 
the formal the legal system. This provides the playing field for contracting and resource 
allocation. We are especially interested in the key variables culture, attitude (the ‘intrinsic 
payoff’ between perceived positive and negative consequences of action) and costs and 
benefits (the ‘external payoff’ of consumer/managerial action) which follow from this 
exposition. With reference to the hypotheses, three problem areas are addressed: 
ingredient labelling, gmo, and claims. 
3.1 Controversies in generic labelling requirements 
Previously we exemplified that the FIR has modified the system of ingredient labelling in a 




A business practice, especially in the production of poultry, is to tumble the food in salty 
water so that it gains weight. As stated, new in the FIR is an exemption of the 5%-rule for 
some meat, poultry and fish products (see § 2). In practice added water – added for 
technical and/or opportunistic reasons- can range from 0% - 50%; so there is every reason to 
address  malpractices, especially when consumers are misled. However, to our 
understanding the simple information that water has been added to such products is far 
from specific enough to influence consumers in a substantial way, as practically all 
businesses apply the same technical strategy8. In case of large quantities of added water it 
therefore still depends on the ‘forensic’ qualities of national authorities to enforce proper 
labelling information on the package.  
 
  
                                                 
8  In principle a quantity indication of an ingredient is not necessary, unless the consumer is misled; the requirement to 





As already stated, the application of engineered nanotechnology will have to be indicated on 
the package next to each ingredient with the designation ‘(nano)’. This message is not 
intended for a specific consumer group, like is the case with allergens; rather, it is a generic 
message addressed to the ‘average consumer’9. The question is why such information is 
prescribed at this moment in time. At present, the ‘average consumer’ is not very familiar 
with the concept of ‘engineered nanotechnology’ (Lee et al., 2005). The indication itself may 
suggest that he/she is taking a serious risk by consuming the food, like is his/her impression 
of gmo. Empirical studies on consumer responses to novel food technologies by Frewer et al. 
(2011) reveal that a perception of ‘unnaturalness’ alone does not instigate public rejection of 
a food. The indication ‘nano’ may spur the food business processors to high levels of hazard 
analysis and risk management. But this is not the primary aim of food information law. The 
indication may come up to the ‘right to know’ of consumers, but where are these consumers 
that ‘wish to know’? The requirement may trigger a negative attitude to the technology 
before it even has found solid ground in food business applications. Similarities may occur 
with the public rejection of gmo-food in Europe, where the European consumer has a 
profound perception of risk, combined with a low perception of potential benefits (Frewer et 
al. 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2005; Mehta, 2004). In the American situation this might be just the 
other way around (compare: Loureiro and Hine, 2004). In principle, engineered 
nanotechnology in foodstuffs or ingredients belongs to the domain of novel foods, but has 
not found its place there due to political disputes about how to change this piece of 
legislation. The fact that the indication ‘nano’ has to be included in the list of ingredients 
comes therefore to a surprise. As stated, the fact that “nano” has to be indicated in the list 
of ingredients might affect consumer’s attitude towards the inclination that such ingredients 
are intrinsically hazardous, while scientific evidence on acute hazards cannot yet be 
substantiated. 
 
country-of-origin labelling (cool) 
 
Region-related product characteristics have a strong credence character. Labelling can help 
the consumer to differentiate products on the basis of its origin. The impacts of credence 
attributes on consumer choices appear to be product-specific and region-specific. A study in 
the EU by Verbeke and Roosen (2009) investigates the potential for market differentiation of 
fresh meat and fresh fish by means of a country-of-origin label, as well of quality and 
traceability information. It appears that -in general- quality marks (like ‘best-before’ 
indications) are more appealing to consumers than origin labels, and these more than 
traceability requirements. For beef, Roosen et al. (2003) concluded that consumers value 
origin labelling of beef more than private brands. Loureiro and Umberger (2007), applying 
choice experiments to US consumers, found that for beef the country-of-origin indication, 
traceability and tenderness are ranked lower than the official safety assurance by American 
authorities (USDA). Consumers that wish to distinguish themselves appear to be more aware 
of the origin of products than other. Also, ethnic ties enhance the awareness in specific 
consumer groups to the country-of-origin (Chand and Tung, 2011; Heslop, 2006)10. Country-
of-origin labelling may be a disguised trade barrier, indicating superior quality or food safety 
                                                 
9  See: Leible (2010) on the typology of the European consumer in food law. 
10  This is ‘the individual’s emotional attachment to shared identity’ (Chand and Tung, 2011). 
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without scientific evidence, to the detriment of international competitors. Potentially, it is a 
source for disputes within the WTO (see in this respect: Hobbs and Kerr, 2006). Moreover, 
several studies confirmed the potential of ethnocentrism in consumer choice11.  
While the labelling benefits for non-red-meat products are doubtful, the transaction costs 
are manifest: investments in new labelling requirements, the task to distinguish origin in 
domestic-nondomestic, etc. The counter-arguments to a broadening of the scope of cool 
may well outperform the pro-arguments, whereas the arguments in favour may be just a 
cover-up for opportunistic motives vested in the protection of home markets. 
3.2 GMO: friend or foe? 
The way foods based on genetic modification techniques are treated in labelling is 
profoundly different in the US compared with Europe. In Europe, for food containing or 
consisting of GMOs, as well as food produced from or containing ingredients produced from 
GMOs, authorisation, supervision and labelling applies on the basis of regulation 
1829/2003/EC. Labelling (a message like ‘contains…’) is exempted in case presence of gmo is 
unintentional and does not exceed a threshold of 0.9%. Whether the presence of such 
material in specific cases is intentional or not is open for dispute. In the Bablok case (C-
442/09, 6 Sept. 2011) a bee keeper with this name and colleagues were accused of 
trespassing the gmo labelling and authorisation requirements, because of the processing and 
sales of honey that included pollen derived by the bees from a maize field planted with gm-
Bt maize. Despite the fact that the pollen had lost their reproductive capacity (and so 
actually gmo’s were absent in the final product honey), and despite the fact that one could 
argue that the material had come into the honey unintentionally, the bee keepers were said 
to have trespassed the authorisation and labelling requirements in Regulation (EC) 
1829/2003.  
The case of gmo-labelling and authorisation to the market highlights a profound disparity 
between the American and European cultural antecedents, which are reflected in the 
institutional settings. Labelling is, as Herrick (2005) states, ‘one of the most effective 
allegories to illustrate the differences between the EU and US cultures of GM’. Notably, the 
food law overhaul that was induced by the BSE-crisis halfway the 90-ies of the previous 
century has changed our regulatory system from ‘supply-driven’ (US) to ‘demand-driven’ 
(EU). The differences between the regions is best exemplified by pointing at the application 
of the producer-friendly principle of ‘substantial equivalence’ in the US: foods that are gmo-
derived  but with respect to their chemical and nutritional properties equivalent to their 
conventional counterparts, are not subjected to an inquiry about their safety, they are GRAS: 
‘generally accepted as safe’12.  
Culture is, according to Hofstede et al. (2010), the ‘collective programming of the mind 
which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another’. Risk 
perception with respect to gmo may be culturally embedded. As to Geert Hofstede (1993), 
uncertainty avoidance is one of the four categories to classify cultural differences between 
nations13. Differences in risk perception materialize in differences in labelling requirements 
and the interpretation of precaution in food regulation. If culturally determined risk 
avoidance is the only factor involved, it is puzzling why the opposition towards GM has been 
                                                 
11  An recent overview of research on the topic is included in Lim et al., 2011. 
12  In Europe there is a long road that leads to authorisation, or not (GMO compass.org, website, downloaded 
      20-05-2010. 
13  The precautionary principle origins from environmental law but has been interpreted in many different ways and is 
included in the General Food Law (Article 5).   
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fierce in the UK and virtually absent in the US, while uncertainty avoidance as well as long-
term orientation for these nations are close to each other (Hofstede, 2010, Index scores of 
2001). Communication channels, lobbying activities, as well as the structure of the ‘contract 
social’ between industry, the citizen and government are explanatory factors as well. While 
legitimate rights of food business processors are not explicitly recognized in the European 
GFL, at the same time – round the turn of centuries- the consumer has been made the focal 
point of all legal action, albeit at the cost of innovation.  
Turning to governance and resource allocation, it can be stated that the gmo-regulations 
have had a negative impact on economic activity, especially reducing the innovative power 
compared to the USA. While 95% of all soya in the US is derived from gm-plants (and the 
monarch butterfly that was at the beginning of the gmo-‘crisis’, still flies its rounds), the 
European production mainly allows gmo in feed and food produced ‘with’ gmo. Persisting  
deeply vested consumer concerns may not easily change. With this, the political gmo-agenda 
for the next decennia has been frozen.  
3.3 To claim or not to claim, that’s the question 
Consumers’ choices are affected by coercive public policies towards acceptance of novel 
foods. It may make investors reluctant to take the risk of applying for market authorisation. 
What is true for acceptance of gmo, or hormone use in the production of beef, may also be 
true with respect to claims on a food package. These can be discerned in nutrition, health, 
and ‘reduction of disease risk’ claims, which are made on foods to be provided ‘as such’ to 
the final consumer (including the mass-caterers). Claims do in principle not address business-
to-business activities. The claims Regulation (EC) 1924/2006, applicable from 1st July 2007 
on, is a specific law, complementing the FIR. Claims have to be approved before they can be 
made. Approved claims are included in positive lists, provided by the Commission, after 
consultation of the SCFCAH, EFSA and stakeholders. A specific regulation to the claims 
regulation and food information regulation is – on top of this – the regulation concerning 
foodstuffs for particular nutritional uses (like baby food or weight controllers).  
Claims indicating that a food cures, prevents or treats a disease are not allowed. However, 
the borderline between a health claim and a medicinal claim is blurred. This already follows 
from the definition for ‘claim’: ‘any message or representation, which is not mandatory 
under Community or national legislation, including pictorial, graphic or symbolic 
representation, in any form, which states, suggests or implies that a food has particular 
characteristics’. For instance, one can ask oneself whether garlic is a medicine or a food? 
(ECJ: Commission vs Germany, 2007)  
Claims that are regulated in (EC) 1924/2006 are meant only for commercial communications 
in the labelling, presentation or advertising of foodstuffs. A nutrition claim pronounces the 
nutritional benefits of a food as to the energy or nutrient content or other substances 
contained in it. In general, nutrition claims are authorised more easily than health claims, as 
the nutritional content of a foodstuff can be measured more easily. For instance, whether a 
product is a source of fibre and a nutrition claim ‘high fibre’’ can be made depends on 
whether it contains at least 6 g of fibre per 100 g or at least 3 g of fibre per 100 kcal. A claim 
like ‘light’ (or ‘lite’) is based on the reduction of a nutrient with at least 30% compared to 
similar products (Annex I to Regulation (EC) 1924/2006).  
A health claim suggests or implies that there is a relationship between the consumption of a 
foodstuff and human health.  Procedures to get a claim accepted are precious and prolong 
the time–to-market substantially, where business practice is that the dynamics of markets 
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have increased considerably in the last decennia. Moreover, there is a sincere risk that a 
claim will not be accepted (and all costs have been made in vain), while at the same time the 
potential benefits after acceptance remain uncertain. A health claim can only be 
underpinned with experiments with humans; animal experiments are not accepted as 
evidence by EFSA14.  Health claims can be listed into categories. Functional health claims are 
those which refer to the role of a nutrient or substance in the growth, development and the 
functions of the body (other than children’s development and health, psychological and 
behavioural functions as well as to slimming or weight control; Article 13 (1) of Regulation 
1924/2006). For this category, the Commission composes a list, and Member States can 
provide inputs. Member States submitted a total of around 44000 functional health claims, 
of which after elimination of all the double entries 4500 remained and upon till now about 
270015 have been evaluated (botanicals, i.e. herbs, have been put on hold16).  
Two kinds of other health claims have to follow individual authorisation procedures: 
‘Reduction of disease risk’ claims and those with respect to children’s development and 
health. For the authorisation of all kind of health claims, scientific substantiation has to be 
provided by the applicant (Article 15 (3) of Regulation 1924/2006). Moreover, the wording of 
the health claim is important, in combination with supplementary mandatory information to 
be allowed to label it (like the statement indicating the importance of a varied and balanced 
diet and a healthy lifestyle, (Article 10 (2) -a). The number of these kind of claims that have 
been authorised upon till now is very limited. The register of health claims at the website of 
DG Sanco holds only 19 accepted health claims till 15th January 2012. Case studies may 
reveal the reasons why the majority of applications have not been accepted yet. Two of 
these are addressed in the following pages. 
 
The Danadol ® case 
 
Danone requested the Commission for permission to use a health claim, with reference to 
Article 14(1) - a of Regulation 1924/2006, worded as: “Danadol ® reduces LDL-cholesterol by 
10% in 3 weeks, and the reduction is maintained with daily consumption. High blood 
cholesterol is one of the main risk factors in the development of (coronary) heart disease”. 
The application procedure had to be followed in concordance with Articles 15-17 of the 
Regulation. This includes an application that is sent to the competent authority of the 
Member State, which will inform EFSA, which in turn will inform the Member States and the 
Commission, and will provide an opinion within 5 months, or will ask the applicant for 
supplementary information. For evaluating this, another two months can be granted. Next, 
the report including the opinion is sent to the Member States, the applicant and the 
Commission, as well as is published in the EFSA-journal. In the context of this claim, it was 
ascertained that elevated low-density lipoprotein (LDL) blood cholesterol is a risk factor for 
coronary heart disease (CHD). The target population of Danadol ® is adults with mildly 
raised cholesterol levels. After studying 23 publications, 19 controlled human studies, 1 
uncontrolled human study, 3 meta-analyses on the effect of phytosterols on LDL-cholesterol 
and two unpublished meta-analyses, a favourable opinion was stated: “a biological 
significant LDL-cholesterol lowering effect can be achieved by a daily intake of 1.6 g 
                                                 
14  European food safety authority, legally initiated by the General Food Law in 2002; EFSA advices on the acceptability of a 
claim to the Commission. 
15  Infromation of H. Verhagen, RIVM, Netherlands, 7/01/2012. 
16  Information by DG Sanco representatives, Brussels, 5/12/2011. 
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phytosterols added to low fat fermented milk products”.  However, EFSA only advises, it 
does not have the final say. In May 2010, that is 9 months after the favourable opinion of 
EFSA, the Commission Regulation is published (Regulation (EU) No 384/2010) that includes 
the health claim, however under different conditions/wording than was proposed by 
Danone. Supposing that EFSA took at least 5 months to provide its opinion, the total time-
till-acceptance has been 14 months or more.  
The bureaucratic system of application is the main cause for the delay in this case. In  
practice many claims do not satisfy the criteria which are set for substantiated scientific 
evidence, which are a specified cause-effect relationship (as to dose-response, specificity, 
consistency, strength and biological plausibility), the quantity that has to be consumed to 
cause the effect and pattern of consumption, as well as specificities about the data gathering 
process (composition of the study group(s), target population, etc.), and of course the 
specific beneficial effect to health which are suggested (see in this respect: EFSA Journal 
2011; 9(6):2233; EFSA guidelines for the submission of health claims). 
 
The LGG-case 
Several subsequent claims relate to the positive effects of LGG. Health claims by Valio Ltd 
were submitted in 2008 based on Article 13(5)17 of the Regulation, referring to a probiotic 
LGG ○R MAX for the reduction of gastro-intestinal discomfort by means of mixtures of strains 
of bacteria (among other Lactobacillus rhamnosus GG). The claims with respect to two 
mixtures of bacteria strains were rejected by EFSA, due to lack of valid scientific evidence of 
a cause-and-effect relationship (doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2008.853). In 2011 the EFSA-panel again 
rejected a similar health claim with respect to Lactobacillus rhamnosus GG (LGG), and its 
proclaimed defence against pathogenic gastrointestinal micro-organisms. The scientific 
evidence that Valio Ltd provided was weighted to be not enough  to proof the cause-and-
effect relationship between LGG and positive effects of the gastro intestinal system (EFSA 
Journal 2011; 9(6): 2167). Finally, a claim was submitted with the generic aim of of “gastro-
intestinal health”. The target population was this time not a specific category of users, but 
the general population. The claim was rejected on grounds that the “claimed effect is not 
sufficiently defined”, and no further details were provided in the proposed wordings. The 
EFSA-Panel (i.e., the Panel on Dietetic Products, Nutrition and Allergies) notes that the 
references addressed several effects, and that it was not possible to establish the effect 
which is the target for the claim.  
In total, since the start of the work of the Commission/EFSA, only 19 health claims have been 
accepted. Only one is based on 13(5) of the Regulation, that gives –as stated- Member States 
the opportunity to submit health claims to be included in a register. 
  
                                                 
17  Supplement to the list of claims (Article 13 (2) of the regulation), with no further authorisation required, on the basis of 




-   Hypothesis 1 was stated as: Information requirements on food ingredients lack logic and 
contribute to transaction costs of food business operators as well as of consumers.  
 
From the modifications and requirements with respect to the listing of ingredients and 
further particulars on added water, gmo and nanotechnology it may be concluded that: 
- cultural differences cannot explain to the full extent why gmo-labelling in the US is 
virtually absent18, while in the EU a strict regime exists which provides for a de facto ban of 
foods including or derived from gmo from the market. Consumer attitudes are different, 
probably because of differential communication of stakeholder groups towards new 
technologies.  
- while a focus on dangers of new technologies might provoke consumer responses 
towards a virtual ban of novel technologies, such coercive reactions will impede negatively 
on the innovativeness of the European food industry along two roads: they may trigger 
policy makers to design restrictive legislation that adds to transaction costs on top of 
development costs, and may adversely induce consumers to avoid products with particulars 
that they do not understand (like ‘nano’). 
- the ‘added water’-example shows, that much is expected of the interpretation 
capabilities of the ‘average consumer’, which has to be aware of an ingredient that he/she 
would not expect in certain foodstuffs. Indeed, the addition of water, although technically 
avoidable, solely out of commercial motives might mislead the consumer and should be 
counteracted. The question is whether this should be done in an indirect way via the 
labelling or directly via prohibition. Food information can only affect consumers’ choices if 
he/she is aware of malpractices. In this case, the un’quid’19ded inclusion of the ingredient 
‘water’ in the list of ingredients will probably not influence the attitude of the consumer20 
towards a foodstuff to a material degree, but will add to the costs of food businesses. As 
said, legal action might better be based on the general prohibition to mislead (Article 14 
GFL). 
 
Hypothesis 2 is: Present food information requirements with respect to gmo are contra-
productive and impede on the innovation capabilities of food business operators. 
 
- the present legislation on the authorisation and labelling of gmo-related foodstuffs is 
coercive. The US takes a completely different standpoint in this respect, which cannot solely 
be explained by pointing at ‘cultural differences’. Consumer attitudes are different, which 
has been induced by adverse communication of stakeholder groups. While all dangers have 
been ruled out, the potential benefits evaporate with it. 
- it should be admitted that gmo-technology, just like nano-technology can be 
dangerous to humans and to the natural environment. But the problem is not primarily that 
a de facto ban from the market has been imposed; the main problem is that – despite the 
fact that European food regulation is intended to be science-based (White Paper on Food 
Safety, 2000; GFL) - the discussion is more governed by emotions than by solid scientific 
evidence. 
                                                 
18  Not really understandable for Europeans is the fact that in the US gmo-foods may potentially be labeled as ‘organic’ due 
to the absence of use of pesticides. 
19  ‘Quid’ stands in labeling language for ‘quantity of ingredient declaration’. 
20  At least, for as far as we know, this has not been scientifically researched. 
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- in practice, application procedures for the admittance of gmo-related foodstuffs ato 
the market are bound to be useless from the start. This seriously hampers the development 
of safe gmo-applications and the competitiveness of the European food industry.   
 
 Hypothesis 3 was formulated as: Present food information requirements with respect 
to health claims are contra-productive and impede on innovation capabilities of food 
business operators.    
 
- a great number of applications have been submitted, and only a staggering 19 health 
claims have been accepted upon till now. The negative success rate shows that the system 
does not work; it just cannot work because of the prolonged time to market, the low chance 
of success, and the technical bottleneck vested in the authorizing authorities’ available time 
and means. Food business managers will change in response their attitude towards the 
submission of health claims and thus towards innovating in new, healthy foods.  
- the institutional system of the US towards health claims is completely different; 
whereas in Europe strong evidence in favor of a claim has to be submitted, the American 
system is much more business-oriented, and the positive effects of foodstuffs on the human 
body can be labeled in a more liberal way. The differences in the institutional systems are 
probably not culturally determined, but related to a sincere fear of negative consumer 
responses to food scares that origins from the midst of the 90s of the last century, as well as 
a fear of negative publicity via pressure groups. 
- the costs of bringing a product with a health claim to the market are significantly 
higher in Europe than in the US. Also the success rate is much smaller. The behavioural 
consequence in business is potentially avoidance behavior: if you can’t positively proof an 
effect of claim x (which is difficult because the effect has to be proven for healthy – not: sick 




 In many cases it is not clear why food information requirements have been vested upon 
industry at the time or in the format that has been chosen. Some of the described novelties 
will not alter the attitude of the consumer significantly, or will have an adverse effect on the 
availability of safe food. Information burdens will negatively influence innovation, as well as 
provoke increased costs of monitoring and control for the food business operators as well 
public authorities. 
 Possible improvements would potentially be made by investigating: 
- retrospectively, the motives and pressures in organizational fields which instigated the 
design of regulatory barriers. For instance, if we understand what mistakes we have 
made with gmo-admittance, we could learn from that for the authorisation of 
nanotechnologies in the future; 
- the present system of food information, with the aim to improve its logic, transparency 
and coherence, not just from a consumer’s perspective, but using a multi-stakeholder 
approach, in which food businesses can claim their legitimate rights alongside 
consumers and othr stakeholder groups; 
                                                 
21  For instance: add certain vitamins or minerals with acknowledged effects, though they are not a necessary ingredient 




- the possibilities of integration and development towards a truly science-based food 
information system, that potentially is not only less costly, but also provides 
information which are substantiated by evidence, not fear (see in this respect: Cheftel, 
2005). 
 
 This paper has presented only some of the problems, pitfalls, policies and progress in 
food information requirements. Certainly, it requires further empirical underpinning. It 
should be clear however that much work still has to be done, so that an effective and 
efficient system of provisions is made available to consumers as well as to business 
operators. The new food information regulation promises in this respect a lot, but offers  
only limited value-for-money. 
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